Federal Circuit IP
Ethanol Boosting Systems, LLC v. Ford Motor Company
Ethanol Boosting Systems, LLC v. Ford Motor Company
CAFC Nos. 2024-1381, 2024-1382, 2024-1383, decided Dec. 23, 2025
(Chen, Clevenger, Hughes)
Issue: Whether the Board exceeded its statutory authority by “staying” a rehearing petition for fifteen months before granting institution.
Overview: Section 314(d) bars challenges to Board institution decisions even when framed as attacks on alleged procedural ultra vires acts like delayed reconsideration rulings.
Background
- MIT/EBS own patents covering fuel management systems using both direct injection and port injection to reduce engine knock.
- Ford petitioned for IPR (Dec. 24, 2020) while district court litigation was pending; Board initially denied institution (July 2021) based on claim construction requiring different fuels for the two injection systems. Ford petitioned for rehearing.
- EBS appealed only one portion of district court’s claim construction; Fed Cir. vacated in EBS I (July 2022), holding that the claims encompass single-fuel embodiments.
- Board granted Ford’s rehearing petition in November 2022, fifteen months after Ford filed, and instituted IPR based on EBS I construction.
- Board found all challenged claims obvious, adopting plain meaning of “fuel” and declining to exclude gasoline as anti-knock agent (non-appealed portion of district court’s construction).
Holding: Affirmed.
Federal Circuit Analysis:
- Section 314(d) bars challenges where a party “essentially” contends “the agency should have refused to institute.” See Thryv, Inc v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP, 590 U.S. 45, 60 (2020).
- Framing agency action as ultra vires stay was unpersuasive because (i) there is no statute requiring Board to rule on reconsideration within specified time, (ii) Appellant expressly asked Court to de-institute the IPRs, and (iii) precedent establishes that formally attacking different agency action does not remove challenge from Section 314(d)’s scope when underlying goal is overturning institution.
- No “shenanigans” exception to Section 314(d) under Cuozzo because it was reasonable for Office to wait for Fed. Cir. to address exact claim term at issue in the institution denial. See Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Com. for Intell. Prop., 579 U.S. 261, 275 (2016).
Takeaways:
- “No Appeal” bar of Section 314(d) reaches broadly, so framing an attack as challenging ultra vires acts does not circumvent 314(d)’s bar when the ultimate goal is to undo institution. Absent specific statutory deadlines, the Board has discretion to delay reconsideration decisions to await relevant appellate guidance.